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THOUGHTS ON HAYDEN C. COVINGTON AND THE PAUCITY 
OF LITIGATION SCHOLARSHIP  
Ronald K.L. Collins* 
Start here: Hayden Cooper Covington (1911–1978). His name defined him.   
Heathen. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word refers 
to someone who holds, “religious beliefs of a sort that are considered 
unenlightened, . . . not of the Christian, Jewish, or Muslim faiths.” By that 
measure, he fit the definitional bill. His first name, Hayden, circled back in 
etymological time to the German Heiden, meaning “heathen.” On the one 
hand, it is strange that a man who devoted his life to defending religious 
liberty should be tagged a “heathen.” On the other hand, it is entirely 
understandable given the religious beliefs he defended—those of a non-
Trinitarian sect that negated the immortality of the soul and denied the 
existence of Hell. In short, those whose faith he defended were often seen as 
heathens, enemies of True Faith. That his faith encouraged conscientious 
objection to military service in wartime and likewise urged its followers to 
refuse to salute the American flag only increased the animus (local and 
worldwide) directed at such “unpatriotic” “heathens.” And then there is this: 
to be named a “Jehovah’s Witnesses” has long been viewed (and continues 
to be in many parts of the world) as a badge of madness of the kind that 
invites censure, censorship, condemnation and incarceration.1 
In sum, Hayden Covington, the “heathen” from birth who headed the 
Watchtower Society’s legal team, made it his life calling to defend the rights 
of his fellow “heathens.” Yet in time, he was forced to take his leave from 
his beloved Witnesses, though he was accepted back into the group’s fold 
just prior to his death in 1978.  
 
*Co-director, History Book Festival. Former Harold S. Shefelman Scholar, University of Washington 
School of Law. This Article (© 2019 Ronald Collins) benefited greatly from comments made at workshops 
at New York Law School and CUNY Law School and also from comments offered during my presentation 
at the annual conference of the First Amendment Lawyers Association. Thanks go out as well to Professors 
Larry Tribe, David Vladeck, and Kathryn Watts for their most helpful suggestions and to Cheryl Nyberg 
of the University of Washington Gallagher Law Library for her invaluable research assistance. 
Additionally, I have benefitted from the thoughtful and timely works (cited below) of Professor Richard 
Lazarus, whose scholarship in the area of Supreme Court litigation is a model for others to follow. 
 1 In Germany, Witnesses were placed in concentration camps and were in the words of the British 
Ambassador to Germany, ‘almost as badly treated as the Jews.’ In Britain 1593 Witnesses were 
convicted for refusing conscription and many, including 334 women, were imprisoned. In the United 
States prosecution and incarceration of some 4000 Witnesses under selective service laws followed 
its entry into the war. 
William Shepard McAninch, A Catalyst for the Evolution of Constitutional Law: Jehovah’s Witnesses in 
the Supreme Court, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 997, 1015 (1987) (footnotes omitted). 
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Think of it: what better exemplar of First Amendment freedom than this 
maverick of a man, this “heathen” who defended “heathens” and did so at 
time when the tide of public sentiment stood to destroy him. And yet, many 
in the world of First Amendment law know little or nothing of the man and 
his many contributions to our first freedom. Why? 
 
 
 
The world of American free speech law is populated with many names, 
from Benjamin Bache to Benjamin Gitlow, from James Madison to 
Alexander Meiklejohn, and from Holmes and Brandeis to Kennedy and 
Roberts. And then there is Floyd Abrams, the most noted First Amendment 
lawyer of our time. But what of Hayden Covington, who argued more First 
Amendment cases in the Supreme Court than all others? Who was he and 
what is his legacy? And what does his obscurity say about today’s public law 
scholarship?  
To raise such questions is to point to the problem, the key one: So much 
of legal scholarship is infatuated with appellate decisional law and those who 
“write” it. (The quotation marks point to the fact that today few appellate 
judges actually write their own opinions, leaving it instead to the handiwork 
of young law clerks.) In other words, if lawyers like Hayden Covington are 
virtually ignored in our scholarship and casebooks, it is first and foremost 
because of the judge-made-law view that is so much the norm in modern 
American legal thinking.  
We live in court-centric times. That is, the law is equated with the work-
product of judges, and this with sustained frequency. Judicial review is the 
altar at which many worship. By that measure, John Marshall is the High 
Lord of all things deemed law. Ever since 1803 when he pronounced on the 
rule and role of judicial review2 in our constitutional system of government, 
the ever-evolving tendency has been to look to appellate judges to 
comprehend everything from the workings of the Commerce and Taxing 
Power Clauses, to the ambiguities of the Eleventh Amendment, to the 
mysteries of the Equal Protection Clause, to the modern-day meanings of the 
First Amendment. And the same is often the stock-in-trade of how private 
law is taught and written about, ranging from remedial matters in the law of 
contracts, to the level of liability in torts, to the meaning of a testamentary 
document in wills. To discern the law and its meaning, we all too often look 
first and finally to what judges do and say.  
In light of this, too many teachers and scholars of the law remain 
shamelessly silent about what lawyers do beforehand in writing statutes, 
 
2 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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drafting regulations, crafting ordinances, preparing corporate bylaws, 
negotiating deals, or in representing their clients at trial and on appeal. To be 
sure, there are exceptions3 as in the case of clinical4 and transactional 
approaches5 to teaching law along with what appears in a few specialty 
journals.6 But the lion’s share of what is taught (at least in the first7 and 
second8 years of law school) and what is written about in scholarly journals9 
(particularly in constitutional law and criminal procedure) has to do with 
judicial opinions, with the work-product of appellate judges. That is the 
portrait of the law portrayed in much of the scholarship currently published 
in American law journals.10 
There was a time when the official U.S. Reports set out the lawyers’ 
arguments in considerable detail in order to set the scene for the opinions that 
followed. That practice ended in 1941.11 Since then, the role of lawyers in 
 
3 See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CONTEMPORARY CIVIL LITIGATION (2009) (discussing 
strategic, tactical, and practical choices inherent in civil litigation and using a variety of non-decisional 
materials).  
4 There are, for example, Supreme Court litigation clinics that exist in more and more law schools. 
See Jeffrey L. Fisher, A Clinic’s Place in the Supreme Court Bar, 65 STAN. L. REV. 137 (2013) (insofar 
as clinics have control over which cases they bring to the Court and can cause the Court to hear cases that 
it might not otherwise have heard, the clinics’ work can implicate sometimes-latent tensions between 
client-centered representation and cause-based advocacy).  
5 See Ronald Collins & Edward Rubin, To Aid Business, Change Law School, N.Y. TIMES, March 
5, 1995, at F9 (calling for changes to how law is taught and for need to move to more transactional 
approaches to teaching commercial law).  
6 There is also West’s informative and historically rich Law Stories Series. See Series, WEST 
ACADEMIC, http://home.westacademic.com/series (click on “Law Stories Series” within the “Overviews” 
section) (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). Even here, however, the work of the lawyers is too often presented in 
abbreviated form (sans any serious analysis) as the story moves at a good clip from the facts to what the 
appellate courts ruled. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, The Story of Korematsu: The Japanese-American Cases, 
in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 249–95 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) (virtually no mention of the 
lawyers who argued the case in the Supreme Court and no analysis of the briefs they presented to the 
Court).  
7 See Margaret Martin Barry, Practice Ready: Are We There Yet?, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 247, 
268–69 (2012) (discussing the “underlying problems with the casebook method”).  
8 See id. at 272–73 (Second-year “[t]eachers who do the hard work of incorporating active learning 
methods do so knowing that their primary institutional reward will come, not from their efforts to improve 
what students learn, but from production of scholarship that is of attenuated use to their students” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
9 Similar trends seem to be at play with online scholarly journals that publish shorter articles. Even 
if such online sources prove more diverse in the range of their selections (e.g., they post essays that 
scrutinize the work of administrative agencies or examine tax policies), the constant appears to be the 
same so far as any serious study of the work-product of lawyers, particularly appellate lawyers.   
10 Journals such as The Review of Litigation are the exception.  
11 See Frank D. Wagner, The Role of the Supreme Court Reporter in History, 26 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 
9, 16 (2001) (“The practice tapered off and finally ceased during the tenure of Mr. [Ernest] Knaebel in 
1941. Office records do not reveal why this occurred.”). See also Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme 
Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 
1328–29 (1985). 
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Supreme Court cases has received ever less and less attention. In what should 
be seen as a disconcerting state of affairs, the official Supreme Court site12 
along with some of the leading online websites13 (such as Findlaw and 
Cornell’s Legal Information Institute) do not list the names of the attorneys 
in the posted opinions of the Supreme Court. Thus, if one were to go the 
former’s14 or latter’s15 link on Citizens United v. Federal Elections 
Commission,16 one would have no idea that the attorneys who argued the case 
were Theodore Olson (for the Appellant), Elena Kagan (Solicitor General for 
the Appellee), Floyd Abrams (for Senator Mitch McConnell, as amicus 
curiae in support of Appellant), and Seth Waxman (for Senators John 
McCain et al. as amici curiae in support of Appellee).17 Professor Richard 
Lazarus has rightly observed that “[w]hat is wholly absent . . . from that 
media scrutiny and scholarly commentary is any recognition of the 
significance for the Supreme Court and the nation’s laws, of the identity of 
the advocates who argue[] before the Court . . . .”18 Of course, this omission 
has long been the practice in casebooks, which have for over a century almost 
uniformly carved the lawyers out of the case accounts. The implication is that 
what the lawyers think—how they conceptualized and analyzed the case—is 
of little or no moment. Where such practices constitute the governing norm, 
few, if any, students would ever know of the remarkable insight that Robert 
L. Carter had when he argued that implicit in the First Amendment is a right 
of association,19 the same right later affirmed by Justice John Harlan in his 
landmark opinion in NAACP v. Alabama.20  
 
12 See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145 (2013) (not listing lawyers who argued 
the case), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-1231_32q3.pdf.  
13 The same is true of the Justia postings of Supreme Court opinions. See JUSTIA, 
http://supreme.justia.com (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
14 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, FINDLAW, 
https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/08-205.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
15 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH.: LEGAL INFO. 
INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/08-205.ZS.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
16 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
17 By and large, the Oyez website still sees value in providing such information. See Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission, OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-
2009/2008/2008_08_205 (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).  
18 Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the U.S. Supreme Court: Transforming 
the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1488 (2008). Lazarus goes on to note “the 
emergence of a modern Supreme Court Bar whose expertise in Supreme Court advocacy has quietly 
transformed the Court’s docket and its substantive rulings.” Id. For a thoughtful and informed account of 
the practice and influence of lawyers who argue before the high Court, see KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, THE 
SUPREME COURT BAR: LEGAL ELITES IN THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY (1993). 
19 See RONALD K.L. COLLINS & SAM CHALTAIN, WE MUST NOT BE AFRAID TO BE FREE: STORIES 
ABOUT FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 134–71 (2011) (discussing case history and Robert L. Carter’s 
lawyerly involvement in it). 
20 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
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Practically and theoretically speaking, much is lost by this myopic 
approach to law. By considering law from the vantage point of the lawyer,21 
the study of the law stands to be more holistic;22 it also stands to be enriched 
in legal realist ways ranging from constitutional norms to commercial 
negotiations. A lawyer’s perspective (be it in estate planning or securities law 
counseling) is before the fact of judicial review. For that matter, a good 
lawyer will often want to advise her client in such a way as to avoid judicial 
intervention. And when judicial review is unavoidable, it is the lawyer who 
must then plan the scope of a deposition, or the guidance to be given to a 
criminally accused, or the manner of how a case is to be briefed and argued 
on appeal duly attentive to existing law.  
And then there is this point: as law teachers we put a lot of stock into 
how cases are decided and how opinions are structured without fully 
appreciating the ways in which the issues were presented to the Justices 
beforehand by the lawyers in the case. That is, even accepting a court-centric 
model, it might not always be clear why judges decided cases the way they 
do without the context of the ways in which the issues were first presented to 
them. Even after the fact of judicial review, it is lawyers who must first apply 
that judge-announced law to the facts of future cases. As Professor David 
Vladeck has rightfully noted:  
[L]aw schools fail students by focusing only on opinions and 
not briefs. . . . [All too often, law professors fail to ask] 
students to read briefs; indeed, I know of no professor who 
ever has asked students to read briefs, except, perhaps, 
professors who teach appellate advocacy courses. But that 
use of briefs is for skills training, not to see how doctrine 
evolves. The only mention of briefs in law school is the 
mention of Brandeis brief, and that is simply a way of 
describing a brilliant advance by a brilliant lawyer.23 
And most assuredly, doctrine does evolve in important part by how it is 
shaped by lawyers.   
 
21 There is also something to be said, though not much on this occasion, about considering law 
from the perspective of lawmakers. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 
197 (1976). 
22 See Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to Us All”, 
74 J. AM. HIST. 1013, 1032–33 (1987) (Constitutional history “requires a perspective wide enough to 
incorporate the relations between official producers of constitutional law, and those who at particular 
times and in particular circumstances resisted or reinterpreted constitutional law.”). Such a holistic 
approach is taken in LINDA H. EDWARDS, READINGS IN PERSUASION: BRIEFS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 
(2012) (discussing strategies used in classic Supreme Court briefs along with descriptions of the lawyers 
and the briefs they authored. Cases discussed include Muller, Brown, Loving, Miranda, Gideon, Griswold, 
Furman, Lawrence, and Meritor). 
23 E-mail from David Vladeck to author (Aug. 5, 2013) (on file with author). 
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Another reason why the work-product of lawyers is largely absent from 
how law is taught and examined has to do with the makeup of the 
professoriate in the legal academy. Many law professors come to their 
profession with relatively little lawyering experience. Just consider the 
“ideal” candidates for teaching slots—young women and men who graduated 
from Ivy League schools and then clerked for a federal circuit judge and 
thereafter clerked on the United States Supreme Court. Sometimes their 
résumés may include a few years in a big firm, but that is more for the 
“parsley effect” (i.e., for appearance’s sake). For the most part, the “better 
law schools” do not hire practicing lawyers with any meaningful and 
extended experience. They hire scholars and teachers.24 But think about it: 
why are bright lawyers less inclined to be bright teachers and scholars? Why 
does the practice of law count more as a hiring disadvantage than as an 
indicator of potential worth?  
Scholarship: Perhaps this concern best explains some of the bias against 
practicing lawyers and those who discuss their work. Their so-called “nuts-
and-bolts” take on life and law, so the argument goes, blinds lawyers to the 
nuances of “high theory.” There is no “meta” in their understanding of law; 
there are no “paradigm shifts” in their views of doctrine; there is no profound 
“cost-benefit” appreciation of the law; there are no “normative theories” in 
their legal calculations; there is no “gestalt take” in their interpretation of how 
law evolves; and there are no “empirical prototypes” in how they do their 
work. That, at any rate, may be the general tenor of the bias. The problem 
with the bias is threefold: First, it merges the study of law with the study of 
philosophy, sociology, history, psychology, and economics. Law is, of 
course, related to all of those, but it is more . . . and also less. Second, the bias 
assumes that even if law is seen through such heady lenses, practicing 
lawyers are unable to appreciate such views of the law—they are too 
consumed with the mechanics of law to grasp its weighty jurisprudential side. 
As with so many other generalizations in life and law, this bias degrades and 
thereby devalues the mindset of some of the best of our lawyers. And finally, 
legal scholarship (of the “highest order”) is and must remain theoretical and 
not practical (if only to accommodate the wishes of aspirational 
philosophers). Where phrases like “democratic competence” and “sociology 
of knowledge”25 spice the pages of legal scholarship, there is little desire to 
 
24 See NEIL DUXBURY, JURISTS AND JUDGES: AN ESSAY ON INFLUENCE 43–44 (2001) (discussing 
character of legal scholarship among professors at elite schools).  
25 See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Guardians of Knowledge in the Modern State: 
Post’s Republic and the First Amendment, 87 WASH. L. REV. 369, 374–80 (2012) (critiquing use of such 
terminology).  
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“ratchet down” into the rhetorical realm of the real.26 Here, too, a dollop of 
sober modesty can be salutary: profound thinking need not be wrapped in 
perplexing terminology. Clarity of expression, after all, is a sign of clarity of 
thought, the kind typical of good lawyering.  
Beyond the question of how much legal scholarship speaks to sitting 
judges,27 there is also the question of its usefulness, if any, to practicing 
lawyers. Even among seasoned appellate lawyers, one wonders how much 
contemporary scholarship is useful to them. Additionally, if scholars ignore 
the litigation practices of appellate lawyers, then their scholarship’s value is 
diminished even more. Here again, there is the problem of the insularity of 
much public law scholarship and the audiences to which it is or is not 
directed. By that conceptual measure, it seems that too much legal 
scholarship neither focuses on litigation nor is concerned with informing 
those who practice in the area of public law.28  
My primary aim here is not to debunk theoretical scholarship,29 or to 
disparage decisional law scholarship, or even to be unduly harsh about the 
way law professors teach. Rather, my real concern is to broaden the lens 
through which law professors and law students study and understand law. 
 
26 See David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-school-associates-learn-to-be-
lawyers.html (“Law schools have long emphasized the theoretical over the useful, with classes that are 
often overstuffed with antiquated distinctions, like the variety of property law in post-feudal England. 
Professors are rewarded for chin-stroking scholarship, like law review articles with titles like ‘A Future 
Foretold: Neo-Aristotelian Praise of Postmodern Legal Theory.’”). In light of such depictions, it is all too 
easy to be reminded of Jonathan Swift’s Academy of Lagado and with the disdain its professoriate had 
for things practical. For a critical reply to such claims and portrayals, see Brian Leiter, David Segal’s 
Hatchet Job on Law Schools…, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL REPORTS (Nov. 20, 2011), 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2011/11/another-hatchet-job-on-law-schools.html, and Larry 
Ribstein, The NYT on Law Teaching, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Nov. 20, 2011), 
http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/11/20/the-nyt-on-law-teaching/ (“The real problem . . . is not that law 
professors are teaching theory rather than the way to the courthouse, but that their choices of which 
theories to teach pay insufficient attention to the skills and knowledge today’s and tomorrow’s market 
demands.”) Here again, some moderation is salutary. That is, whatever the state of education in the legal 
academy and the scholarship it produces, can it reasonably be denied that too often too much attention is 
devoted to judicial review to the exclusion of the work of lawyers?  
27 See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM AND THE AMERICAN 
LEGAL MIND 70 (1996); see also Pierre Schlag, Writing for Judges, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 419, 422 (1992) 
(“The academic practice of writing for judges, increasingly appears as a degraded art-form used to 
communicate with personas who are not listening . . . .”).  
28 See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT – AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: 
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 5 (1992) 
(“Practitioners tend to view much academic scholarship as increasingly irrelevant to their day-to-day 
concerns, particularly when compared with the great treatises of an earlier era.”). 
29 In all of this, I do not deny the importance of such scholarship, if only because I have done my 
small share of it. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, Outlaw Jurisprudence?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 215 (1997) 
(deconstructing the thought of a leading deconstructionist).  
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Those of us in the legal academy could do much to enhance the educational 
experience by paying more attention to how the law is actually applied, 
construed, and developed by lawyers. 
 
 
 
What to do? Well, the time is ripe for those of us in the academy to 
abandon our unfounded biases and open our minds to the rich world of 
litigation scholarship. And what exactly is that? Let me paint with a broad 
brush, if only for openers.  
By litigation scholarship I mean scholarship focusing on the adversarial 
process and how practicing lawyers work with clients, strategize with each 
other and groups, make arguments in legal documents, examine witnesses, 
and interact with trial and appellate judges at the state and federal levels. To 
be sure, there is surely more to the lawyering process than that and I do not 
mean to deny the importance of things like lawyer counseling, planning, and 
various other kinds of non-litigation practice. Those are all areas worthy of 
the legal academy’s serious attention. But one must start somewhere, and so 
I begin with a focus on litigation. To be more precise, my concerns on this 
occasion are with appellate litigation, primarily at the level of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. Here, too, I do not wish to devalue the importance 
of litigation at the federal or state intermediate appellate levels—indeed, 
academic attention in this area is sorely needed. The reason I have selected 
the niche that I have is simple: it is the world I now know best, at least at this 
stage in my life. As someone who has spent the past few decades working 
with lawyers who argue public-law cases (especially First Amendment 
freedom of expression ones30) before the High Court, I have learned quite a 
bit about that world and those who practice in it. That affiliation has greatly 
broadened my understanding of the law; and it has also alerted me to how 
deficient my knowledge was without it. Thus, have I come to this scholastic 
juncture. 
While many scholarly pages—in articles, casebooks, and law-related 
books generally—have been devoted to what judges have written in historic 
First Amendment cases such as Schenck v. United States,31 Chaplinsky v. 
 
30 For years I was a scholar at the First Amendment Center (part of the Newseum) in Washington, 
D.C. While the Center is a non-profit, non-partisan, and non-litigation group committed to educating 
Americans about the five freedoms of the First Amendment, it once interacted quite heavily with those 
who practice in this area of the law. Today, I work with many First Amendment lawyers, professors, and 
journalists in connection with the First Amendment Salons co-hosted with the Floyd Abrams institute for 
Freedom of Expression.   
31 249 U.S. 47 (1919). See THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES: A FREE SPEECH CHRONICLE AND 
READER 219–21 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed.) (2010) (noting the lawyers who argued the case).  
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New Hampshire,32 United States v. Stevens,33 Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Association,34 and United States v. Alvarez,35 relatively little has 
been or is likely to be said about the lawyers in those cases and even less by 
way of any extended analysis of how those cases and many others were 
briefed and argued.36 In part, and as Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has 
observed,37 this is due to the fact that until somewhat recently it was difficult 
to access the appellate briefs to examine the work of the lawyers in the 
aforementioned cases and others. Thus, previous generations of legal 
scholars either had to check with the Supreme Court library, the Library of 
Congress, a few other select law libraries, or consult the voluminous 
Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States 
once edited by Philip B. Kurland and Gerhard Casper, which only included 
briefs from notable cases. But that world is no longer: The more recent of 
Supreme Court briefs and transcripts of oral arguments are today readily 
accessible online38 at sites such as SCOTUSblog. As for earlier cases, many 
law schools now have the Gale Group’s39 complete online compendium of 
Supreme Court Records and Briefs from 1832 to 1978. As for lawyers’ 
profiles, Lexis-Nexis has launched Litigation Profile on Judges, Attorneys, 
 
32 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
33 559 U.S. 460 (2010). See Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: Exceptional Freedom – The Roberts 
Court and the New Absolutism, 76 ALBANY L. REV. 409, 424–25 (2013) (discussing briefs and arguments 
made by Patricia Millett on behalf of the Respondent).  
34 564 U.S. 786 (2011). See Collins, supra note 33, at 431 (discussing briefs and arguments made 
by Paul M. Smith submitted on behalf of the Petitioner). Subsequently, Mr. Smith filed an amicus brief 
on behalf of the National Coalition Against Censorship in support of the Petitioner in Butt v. Utah, 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/12-348-ncacamicus.pdf (defendant 
prosecuted and convicted of violating state harmful materials to minors law re hand-drawn sketches of 
himself that were mailed to his wife and to be shared with his then five-year-old daughter).  
35 567 U.S. 709 (2012). See Collins, supra note 33, at 435–36 (discussing briefs and arguments 
submitted on behalf of the Respondent).  
36 But see Ronald K.L. Collins, NUANCED ABSOLUTISM: FLOYD ABRAMS AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT (2013) (discussing and critiquing Floyd Abrams’s manner of arguing First Amendment 
cases and causes); Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Curious Concurrence: Justice Brandeis’ Vote 
in Whitney v. California, 2005 S. CT. REV. 333 (2005) (discussing appellate lawyers and the arguments 
they made in Gitlow v. New York and Whitney v. California).   
37 This by way of a phone conversation we had in early December of 2012. 
38 See Chad M. Oldfather, Joseph P. Bockhorst & Brian P. Dimmer, Triangulating Judicial 
Responsiveness: Automated Content Analysis, Judicial Opinions, and the Methodology of Legal 
Scholarship, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (2012) (“The increasing availability of digital versions of court 
documents, coupled with increases in the power and sophistication of computational methods of textual 
analysis, promises to enable both the creation of new avenues of scholarly inquiry and the refinement of 
old ones.”). 
39 See The Making of Modern Law: U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, 1832–1978, GALE, 
https://www.gale.com/c/making-of-modern-law-us-supreme-court-records-and-briefs-1832-1978 (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2019). 
02 - COLLINS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/19  12:30 PM 
608 FIU Law Review [Vol. 13:599 
and Experts, which offers a rich selection of information and resources 
materials heretofore either unavailable or difficult to compile.40  
Hence, we are now able to examine, for example, what arguments Alan 
Morrison made on behalf of the Litigation Group41 in his amicus brief in 
Bigelow v. Virginia42 and in his merits brief and oral arguments in Virginia 
Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumers Council.43 Important as those briefs 
were in those cases, there was much more at stake here than any won-and-
done efforts to persuade the Court move on doctrine. That is, Morrison and 
the Litigation Group were ongoing participants in the development of 
doctrine before the Supreme Court. For example, the Litigation Group filed 
briefs in virtually every commercial speech case, each of which bore the 
Morrison stamp: for example, he argued Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel44 and then worked with David Vladeck who argued Edenfield v. 
Fane.45 Between the two of them, they filed briefs in many of the Court’s 
commercial speech cases and in many lower court commercial speech cases 
as well. Thus, the Litigation Group’s influence on the development of 
commercial speech was significant. Viewed from this vantage point, we can 
better understand how the modern-day commercial speech doctrine 
developed not merely from the detached mind of Justice Harry Blackmun, 
the author of Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy, but from the lawyering skills 
of a public-interest advocates.46  
There is historical value47 in examining the appellate work of lawyers in 
such cases. It can help us to better understand how ideas, doctrines, and 
 
40 See Litigation Profile Suite, LEXISNEXIS, https://advance.lexis.com/lpshome/ (last visited Feb. 
2, 2019).  
41 See Litigation Initiative, PUBLICCITIZEN, http://citizen.org/our-work/litigation (last visited Feb. 
2, 2019) (“The Litigation Group is the litigating arm of Public Citizen. The Group works on cases at all 
levels of the federal and state judiciaries, and specializes in cases involving regulation, consumer rights, 
access to the courts, open government, and the First Amendment, including Internet free speech.”). 
42 Brief for Amici Curiae Public Citizen and Center for Women Policy Studies, Bigelow v. 
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (No. 73-1309), 1974 WL 186260. 
43 Brief of Appellees, Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976) (No. 74-895), 1975 WL 173826; Oral Argument at 22:50, Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (No. 74-895), 
https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/burger4/oral_argument_audio/16084 via @oyez. 
44 Brief of Appellant, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626 
(1985) (No. 83-2166), 1984 WL 565570. David Vladeck, then with the Litigation Group, did a lot of the 
work on the brief filed with the Court. 
45 Brief of Respondent, Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (No. 91-1594), 1992 WL 547197. 
46 See Alan Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine: An Originalist’s 
Recollections, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1189 (2004). 
47 See R. Kirkland Cozine, The Emergence of Written Appellate Briefs in the Nineteenth-Century 
United States, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 482 (1994). 
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paradigms in the law originated and developed.48 In that regard consider this: 
For all that has been published on Whitney v. California,49 before 2010 
relatively little of critical worth was written about how the lawyers for Anita 
Whitney argued her case at the trial level.50 More troublesome still is that 
historians and others have paid negligible attention to the appellate briefs 
prepared on her behalf, which along with other materials could help to 
explain Justice Brandeis’s curious concurrence in that case.51 So, too, with 
the briefs filed in Lovell v. Griffin52 (a Jehovah’s Witnesses’ case), especially 
the amicus one filed by the famed ACLU by Osmond Fraenkel53 assisted by 
Francis Biddle,54 the future Attorney General.  
There is more: Simply consider something else that has been nearly lost 
to history, namely, the farsighted brief prepared in 1975 by then Professor 
Hans Linde55 on behalf of the Oregon Newspaper Publishers Association. In 
his brief to the Oregon Supreme Court Linde successfully argued that limits 
on political campaign spending violated the free speech clause of the state 
constitution56—this before Buckley v. Valeo57 was handed down. By the same 
measure, much stands to be learned about the development of First 
Amendment law and campaign financing by tracking and examining the 
 
48 See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins & Jennifer Friesen, Looking Back on Muller v. Oregon, A.B.A. 
J., April 1983, at 294, 294–98, 472–77 (discussing history and importance of the “Brandeis Brief”).  
49 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
50 The exception was HAIG BOSMAJIAN, ANITA WHITNEY, LOUIS BRANDEIS, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 90–124 (Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. Press ed., 2010). Admirable as its treatment of the 
lawyer’s role in the Whitney trial, the book offered no similar treatment of the appellate work in the case.   
51 But see Collins & Skover, supra note 36, at 349–72, 379–86 (discussing and critiquing appellate 
briefs and examining the reasons for J. Brandeis’s concurrence).  
52 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). The last Jehovah’s Witnesses’ case to be decided by the 
Court was Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (a 
case not argued by Hayden Covington but by Blanca Bianchi de la Torre). 
53 Brief and Motion on Behalf of American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, Lovell v. 
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (No. 391), 1938 WL 39268. Among other things, he argued 26 cases in the 
Supreme Court, including Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), and DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 
353 (1937). See ROGER K. NEWMAN, Osmond K. Fraenkel, in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF 
AMERICAN LAW 200 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009) [hereinafter BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY].   
54 See SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 108 
(Oxford University Press ed., 1990). Biddle was a law clerk to Justice Holmes and thereafter, among other 
things, a Third Circuit Judge, Solicitor General of the United States, and then, in 1941, he served as U.S. 
Attorney General (he drafted Exec. Order No. 9066 re the Japanese Internment) and later as served a judge 
at the Nuremberg Trials. See GREG ROBINSON, Francis Biddle, in BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY, supra 
note 53, at 43–44.   
55 Re Hans Linde and his career in American law, see HANS LINDE, INTELLECT AND CRAFT: THE 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF HANS LINDE TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 3–8 (Robert F. Nagel ed., 1995); 
Symposium on the Work of Justice Hans Linde, 70 OR. L. REV. 679, 679–906 (1991). Full disclosure: I 
clerked for the Judge in 1981. 
56 See Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47 (1975).  
57 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  
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Supreme Court cases argued by James Bopp,58 who has argued Wisconsin 
Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission,59 Randall v. Sorrell,60 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,61 and who wrote the jurisdictional 
brief in McCutcheon v. Federal Elections Commission62 along with the 
Republican National Committee merits brief63 in that case, among other 
cases. 
Scholars and students of federalism would find much of interest in the 
oral arguments of Solicitor General Robert Bork when he defended, albeit 
unsuccessfully, Congress’s expansive powers in National League of Cities v. 
Usery.64 “I think this is a very unintrusive statute,” said General Bork in his 
exchange with Chief Justice Burger. “[T]here can be no doubt,” he added, 
“that interstate is involved when state and local governments in 1971 
purchased goods and services worth $135 billion, which was at the time 12% 
of our gross national product . . . .”65 And then, in an exchange with Justice 
Rehnquist, General Bork further added: “When this Court has over the 
centuries attempted to find a formula for confining the Commerce Clause, 
[it] has never found an adequate formula. I suggest to you that you will never 
find a mechanical bright line distinction that will tell Congress, ‘you may do 
 
58 Among other positions, Mr. Bopp has served as the general counsel for National Right to Life 
and as the special counsel for Focus on the Family.  
59 Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006). 
60 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
61 Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
62 Jurisdictional Statement, McCutcheon v. FEC, 133 S. Ct. 1242 (2014) (No. 12-536), 2012 WL 
5395232. Mr. Bopp’s role in this case and other cases is discussed in RONALD COLLINS & DAVID SKOVER, 
WHEN MONEY SPEAKS: THE MCCUTCHEON CASE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS & THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
(2014) (ebook). 
63 See Brief on the Merits for Appellant Republican National Committee, McCutcheon v. FEC, 
572 U.S. 185 (2014) (No. 12-536), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v2/12-
536_pet_rnc.authcheckdam.pdf. Much the same could just as easily be said of Professor Joel Gora’s work 
on the area by way of his First Amendment challenges to campaign finance like those he contested on 
behalf of the ACLU in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 
Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government 
PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 
Committee, 533 U.S. 431 (2001); McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); 
Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission, 546 U.S. 410 (2006); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 
U.S. 230 (2006); Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007); and 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). In all of these cases, the ACLU 
filed amicus briefs which were co-authored by Professor Gora. See generally Joel Gora, Campaign 
Finance Reform: Still Searching Today for a Better Way, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 137 (1997–1998). 
64 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 
(1985). 
65 Oral Argument at 49:23, Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1974/1974_74_878. 
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this to the states but not do that.’”66 To be sure, there is more to the story, but 
such snippets reveal that history can reveal many an important and forgotten 
idea or argument.  
Additionally, there is that category of legal arguments that was set out 
in a brief but was not recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, for whatever 
reason. Such arguments, like judicial dissents, can prove immensely 
important to lawyers and judges in future cases. Thus, there is both historical 
and practical value in such forms of litigation scholarship. There is also 
educational value—that is, how we in the legal academy teach law students 
how a case is actually argued mindful of the constraints and opportunities 
available to lawyers as they argue a given case at a particular time.  
Mindful of the importance of such history, the study of First 
Amendment law would surely be enhanced if, for example, scholars 
considered and students studied Floyd Abrams’s involvement in the 
Pentagon Papers Case,67 and likewise how he thereafter successfully argued 
Landmark Communications v. Virginia68 and other free expression cases.69 
And then there is the need to examine and critique70 the appellate work done 
by members of the legal academy, for example:  
 
66 Id. at 01:03:01. 
67 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See FLOYD ABRAMS, SPEAKING FREELY: 
TRIALS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1–61 (2005) (discussing how he worked with Professor Alexander 
Bickel in preparing for and briefing case).   
68 435 U.S. 829 (1978). See COLLINS, supra note 36, at 15–26 (discussing Abrams’s litigation 
strategy).  
69 Mr. Abrams discusses his litigation practices in his book FRIEND OF THE COURT: ON THE FRONT 
LINES WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2013). See also COLLINS, supra note 36. 
70 See Adam Liptak, Friend-of-Court Filings Mushroom, and a Law Professor Takes Issue, N.Y. 
TIMES. (Nov. 14, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/us/law-professor-takes-aim-at-supreme-
court-filings.html (“In the [2010-2011] term that . . . , the Supreme Court decided about 80 cases after 
briefing and argument. By Professor [Richard] Fallon’s count, it received 56 briefs from groups of law 
professors. In the term that ended in 1986, by contrast, the court decided twice as many cases, but it 
received only three such briefs.”). The article went on to express some reservations Professor Fallon and 
others had about the quality of some of the amicus briefs being submitted by and signed onto by law 
professors. See Richard Fallon, Jr., Scholars’ Briefs and the Vocation of a Law Professor, 4 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 223 (2012) (critiquing the practice of law professors signing onto amicus briefs), 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__academics__colloquia__legal_p
olitical_and_social_philosophy/documents/documents/ecm_pro_070012.pdf; see also Ward Farnsworth, 
Talking Out of School: Notes on the Transmission of Intellectual Capital from the Legal Academy to 
Public, 81 B.U. L. REV. 101, 104 (2001) (proposing “[some] conventions for law professors who render 
opinions in the course of public debate, [arguing that] when academics offer public opinions in their 
professional capacities they should use the same care and have the same expertise called for in their 
published work, or else should disclose that they are adhering to a lesser standard”).  
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• Thomas Emerson’s merits briefs in Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire71 and Griswold v. Connecticut,72 and his 
amicus brief in Sweatt v. Painter,73  
• Herbert Wechsler’s brief in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,74  
• Mel Nimmer’s brief in Cohen v. California,75  
• Laurence Tribe’s brief76 in Bowers v. Hardwick77 and 
Rust v. Sullivan78 (then Deputy Solicitor General John 
Roberts was on the government’s brief in Rust),  
• the amicus brief submitted by Tribe, John Hart Ely, 
Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland and Kathleen 
Sullivan in Romer v. Evans,79  
• Randy Barnett’s co-authored amicus brief in United 
States v. Lopez,80  
• Erwin Chemerinsky’s brief in Tory v. Cochran,81  
• the amicus brief filed by Eugene Volokh and James 
Weinstein in United States v. Alvarez,82  
 
71 Brief for Appellant, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (No. 175). 
72 Brief for Appellants, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496); see Jonathan Entin, The Law Professor as 
Advocate, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 512, 515–22 (1987) (discussing Emerson’s role in litigating Supreme 
Court cases). 
73 Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (No. 44). 
74 Brief for Petitioner, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 39); see David A. Anderson, Wechsler’s Triumph, 
66 ALA. L. REV. 229 (2014). 
75 Brief for Appellant, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (No. 70-299). 
76 Kathleen Sullivan was his co-counsel. For Tribe’s involvement in the case, see JOYCE 
MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 285–
303 (2001) and LINDA HIRSHMAN, VICTORY: THE TRIUMPHANT GAY REVOLUTION 252, 254, 258–59, 
260–61, 267, 292, 311 (2012).  
77 Brief for Respondent, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140); see also Linda Edwards, Once Upon 
a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77 TENN. L. REV. 885, 900–07 (2010) (discussing briefs 
filed in Hardwick). 
78 Brief for Petitioners, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (No. 89-1391). 
79 Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland, & Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), discussed in 
Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Dissent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J., 1, 117 (1997) 
(“[The majority’s] argument seems to draw on an amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court by Laurence 
Tribe and four other eminent constitutional law scholars (including Ely).”). 
80 Amicus Brief on Behalf of: Academics for the Second Amendment, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 
93-1260).  
81 Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, 544 U.S. 734 (2005) (No. 03-1488); see also Amicus Curiae 
Brief in Support of Respondent by Members of the U.S. Congress, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) 
(No. 02-575), discussed in Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What is Commercial Speech? The Issue 
not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143 (2004).   
82 Brief of Professors Eugene Volokh & James Weinstein as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
567 U.S. 709 (2012) (No. 11-210). Subsequently, Professor Volokh represented the petitioner in Butt v. 
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• the brief filed by Jack Balkin et al. in Shelby County v. 
Holder,83  
• the influential amicus brief submitted on behalf of 
Walter Dellinger and authored by Irving Gornstein84 in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry,85  
• the amicus brief filed by Seth Waxman on behalf of 
Charles Fried and Robert Post in Janus v. American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 
Council 31,86 
• in the securities law world, there is the virtually 
unnoticed brief filed by Professor Tribe in Bulldog 
Investors General Partnership v. Galvin87 wherein it 
was argued that a state ban on truthful speech by an 
issuer of unregistered securities to members of the 
 
Utah, cert denied, 568 U.S. 1192 (2013) (defendant prosecuted and convicted of violating state harmful 
materials to minors law re hand-drawn sketches of himself that were mailed to his wife and to be shared 
with his then five-year-old daughter), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/12-
348-petition.pdf. Professor Volokh’s many and impressive briefs are alone worthy of a scholarly article. 
See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Eagle Forum et al., Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946 (Ind. 2014) 
(challenging constitutionality of criminal intimidation law as applied to a man who criticized a sitting 
judge re a child custody dispute in which he was involved); see also Brief for Respondent, Matal v. Tam, 
137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (No. 15-1293). 
83 Brief of Amicus Curiae of Constitutional Scholars & Constitutional Accountability Center in 
Support of Respondents, Shelby Cty. v. Holder, (2013) (No. 12-96) (Jack Balkin, Guy-Uriel Charles, Luis 
Fuentes-Rohwer, and Adam Winkler). 
84 See Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents on the Issue of 
Standing at 34, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (No. 12-144).  
85 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 715 (2013). Chief Justice John Roberts’s majority opinion 
seems to be heavily influenced by the arguments advanced in detail in the Gornstein amicus brief.  
86 Brief for Amici Curiae Charles Fried & Robert C. Pose in Support of Neither Party, Janus v. 
Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466). 
87 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bulldog Inves. Gen. P’ship v. Galvin, 566 U.S. 987 (2012) (No. 
11-954). 
A book that is long overdue is one that would document and discuss the roles played by noted First 
Amendment lawyers in developing our free speech law—lawyers such as Theodore Schroeder, Walter H. 
Pollak, Leonard B. Boudin, Hayden Covington, Osmond K. Fraenkel, Ephraim London, Stanley 
Fleishman, Jack Greenberg, William Kunstler, Bruce Ennis, John W. Weston, Floyd Abrams, and Eleanor 
Holmes Norton (she was the first woman to argue a First Amendment free expression case on behalf of a 
rights claimant in the Supreme Court: Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968)) and Robert Corn-
Revere, among others.   
By way of another book idea, someone might select, say, twelve noted scholars who submitted briefs 
to the Supreme Court and discuss how they argued the law and how the Court ultimately interpreted it. 
See, e.g., Brief of Law Professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Adam Winkler, as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290). On a related front, there is 
also the line of cases in which renowned scholars argued cases before they began teaching. For example, 
Kent Greenawalt (a noted professor of constitutional law, criminal law and jurisprudence) originally 
argued United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (an obscenity case argued and reargued) on behalf of 
the government. In a 5-4 judgment, the government prevailed.  
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public based upon their financial status violated the First 
Amendment, 
• the amicus briefs in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission filed by the Solicitor 
General’s Office,88 Evan Young89 (for Cake artists), 
Robert Corn-Revere90 (for the First Amendment 
Lawyers Association), Steven Shiffrin91 (for Freedom of 
Speech Scholars), Anna P. Engh92 (for National 
Women’s Law Center), and John Paul Schnapper-
Casteras93 (for NAACP Legal Defense & Education 
Fund), and the certiorari petition filed in 2018 by C. 
Boyden Gray in Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor and 
Industries,94 and 
• finally, there is much to be gained by scholars exploring 
the work-product of federal government lawyers such 
those who urged a court to sanction a local police 
department for violating citizens’ First, Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.95  
 
88 Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
89 Brief for Cake Artists as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. 
v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
90 Brief of Amicus Curiae the First Amendment Lawyers Ass’n in Support of Petitioners, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
91 Brief for Freedom of Speech Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
92 Brief of the Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr. & Other Groups as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 
16-111).  
93 Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. in Support of Respondents, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
94 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor & Indus., 289 Ore. App. 507 
(2017) (another cake case). 
95 See Statement of Interest of the U.S., Sharp v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, No. 1:11-cv-02-888BEL 
(D. Md., Jan. 10, 2012), at 1, available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/Sharp_SOI_1-
10-12.pdf. In this statement, the lawyer for the Civil Rights Division of the Attorney General’s office 
urged a federal district court to sanction a local police department for abridging First, Fourth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. In relevant part, Mr. Thomas Perez of the Civil Rights Division argued: 
This litigation presents constitutional questions of great moment in this digital age: whether private 
citizens have a First Amendment right to record police officers in the public discharge of their duties, 
and whether officers violate citizens’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they seize and 
destroy such recordings without a warrant or due process. The United States urges this Court to 
answer both of those questions in the affirmative. The right to record police officers while 
performing duties in a public place, as well as the right to be protected from the warrantless seizure 
and destruction of those recordings, are not only required by the Constitution. They are consistent 
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The scope of scholarly possibilities broadens the more one reflects on 
the range and value of this kind of study. For example, such scholarship might 
focus on the appellate work done by justices or judges before they were 
elevated to the bench. In this respect, consider the brief John Roberts 
authored when he was at Hogan and Hartson and represented the petitioner 
in Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. United States 
Environmental Protection Agency.96 Though he did not prevail,97 one might 
ask how his views of federalism as argued in his brief might fare in today’s 
legal climate. Admittedly, he was an advocate. But that fact alone does not 
discount the possible merit of the arguments he tendered in that case and the 
value of scrutinizing such arguments under then existing law and likewise 
under current law. There are also the brief and arguments that then Assistant 
Solicitor General, Samuel Alito, tendered in the case of Federal 
Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters of California.98 
Here again, though he argued the case as a government lawyer, nonetheless 
there are some noteworthy arguments he advanced that might warrant future 
scrutiny—for example, the distinctions he made in that case between 
commercial broadcasting and public broadcasting.99 In both cases, the focus 
is on the arguments advanced and what they tell us about how we might or 
might not conceptualize any variety of areas of law. By the same measure, 
there is much to be gained by studying the work done by the attorneys in the 
Solicitor General’s Office and how that work directs the development of the 
law in the Supreme Court.100 
 
with our fundamental notions of liberty, promote the accountability of our governmental officers, 
and instill public confidence in the police officers who serve us daily. 
Id. at 1 (noting enforcement of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14141, which authorizes the Attorney General to file lawsuits seeking court orders to reform police 
departments engaging in a pattern or practice of violating citizens’ federal rights. The United States also 
enforces the anti-discrimination provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.). Notably, this Statement of Interest was subsequently relied 
upon in a case involving the same general issue but in a different county in Maryland. See Garcia v. 
Montgomery Cty., 145 F. Supp. 3d 492 (D. Md. 2015) (Robert Corn-Revere was the attorney for the 
plaintiff).  
96 Brief for Petitioner, Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004) (No. 02-
658) (holding the EPA has the authority under the Clean Air Act to overrule state agencies re whether a 
company is using the “best available controlling technology” to prevent pollution).  
97 Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004). The vote was 5-4 with Justice 
Kennedy in dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. 
98 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
99 See Professor Lisa McElroy Examines U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito’s Historic Oral 
Arguments on C-SPAN Radio, EARL MACKE (Jan. 2, 2013), 
http://earlemacklaw.drexel.edu/news/drexel_law_news/in_the_news/2013-Archive/Mcelroy-Alito-
01022013/. 
100 See, e.g., RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT: EXECUTIVE INFLUENCE AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 134–36 (2012); see also 
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If scholars pay relatively little attention to the work of lawyers, 
especially appellate lawyers, then they are unlikely to have a rich 
appreciation about how our system of justice actually works. Take, for 
example, the elite bar of lawyers who litigate cases before the high Court. 
What do we know about that bar and their impact on certain areas of law?101 
Who are the main players in it? What do we know about the allocation of 
cases by the various firms?102 What about the way a case finds its way to the 
Supreme Court and the role played by lawyers in the process?103 Though 
much needs to be done to answer such questions, we do have some important 
information tendered by Professor Richard Lazarus, who in an important 
2008 article noted: 
The [modern] transformation of the [Supreme Court] Bar 
began when Sidley Austin hired Rex Lee, following his 
resignation as President Ronald Reagan’s first Solicitor 
General in the summer of 1985, to create a Supreme Court 
 
Michael E. Solimine, The Solicitor General Unbound: Amicus Curiae Activism and Deference in the 
Supreme Court, 45 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 1183, 1183 (2014). 
By the same token, much is to be learned about the development of the law by examining the 
appellate work of certain organizations that submit briefs to the Supreme Court. See Tony Mauro, A Strong 
Supreme Court Term for Business, NATIONAL L.J., (2012) (the litigation arm of the Chamber of 
Commerce “counted eight wins in the 13 cases last term in which it filed amicus briefs. In four of the other 
cases, the Court did not reach the issue that the [Chamber of Commerce] briefed, and in the 13th case, the 
Chamber did not take a side.”). In the October 2006 Term, the Chamber of Commerce won “thirteen out 
of fifteen cases, which appears to be directly traceable to the rise of the modern Supreme Court Bar.” 
Lazarus, supra note 18, at 1490–91. 
101 See Richard J. Lazarus, The Power of Persuasion Before and Within the Supreme Court: 
Reflections on NEPA’s Zero for Seventeen Record at the High Court, U. ILL. L. REV. 231, 232 (2012) 
(“[T]he NEPA cases . . . suggest that there is an increasing risk that the Court’s [environmental] docket 
and rulings are being skewed in favor of commercial interests because of the disproportionate ability of 
those interests to retain expert Supreme Court advocates.”). 
102 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 18, at 1499–501 (providing a general overview of some of the 
leading firms who argued before the Court as of 2008). 
103 The statistics are striking. While the number of merits cases has roughly declined by one-half 
during the past three decades, the influence of the expert Supreme Court bar over the plenary docket 
during this same time period has increased approximately tenfold; expert practitioners represent the 
successful petitioner at the jurisdictional stage in more than fifty percent of the cases. 
Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the High Court, 199 YALE L.J. ONLINE 89, 90 (2009). Moreover: 
Interviews with former clerks confirm the obvious: the clerks pay special attention to the petitions 
filed by prominent Supreme Court advocates and to the amicus briefs those advocates succeed in 
having filed in support of review. When they see the name of an attorney whose work before the 
Court they know, at least by reputation, that attorney’s involvement in the case, by itself, conveys 
an important message about the significance of the legal issues being presented and the credibility 
of the assertions being made. 
Lazarus, supra note 18, at 1526. And more needs to be said about the entrepreneurial and/or ideological 
zeal with which some of the lawyers in leading cases round up clients and ensure their own roles as lead 
counsel, etcetera, in important appellate cases. See generally MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 3–4 (2013). 
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and appellate practice in Sidley’s D.C. office. Lee set out to 
establish a highly visible Supreme Court and appellate 
practice that could provide to private sector clients the kind 
of outstanding expert advocacy that the Solicitor General’s 
Office had provided federal agencies. Lee was enormously 
successful from the outset. During the second half of 
October Term 1985, almost immediately after leaving office, 
Lee presented two oral arguments. And then during October 
Term 1986, the first full Term after Lee’s post-government 
recusal period had expired, he presented oral argument in six 
different cases before the Court—then a strikingly high 
number for a private sector lawyer and effectively matching 
the number of arguments typically presented by the Solicitor 
General himself. And, in every case but one, Lee represented 
the petitioner who had successfully obtained Supreme Court 
review.104 
That insight by the Sidley Austin law firm has proven to be the template 
for much of the modern Supreme Court bar practice. So far as that elite bar 
is concerned, how many people of color argue cases before the high Court? 
Is there any corresponding effort to improve the quality of advocacy for the 
criminally accused that appear before the Court?105 And what about women 
and their advocacy before the High Court? As to the last point, we have the 
following observation concerning the workings of the Supreme Court bar:  
Much like the Justices who sit on the Court and the law 
clerks who serve the Justices, the advocates who appear 
before the Court represent a fairly homogeneous group 
primarily consisting of white males. For example, one study 
concluded that, for the 1993 to 2001 Terms, only 150 (13.91 
percent) of the 1,078 attorneys arguing cases orally before 
the U.S. Supreme Court were women, even though 2000 
 
104 Lazarus, supra note 18, at 1498 (footnotes omitted). Notably, Lazarus adds: “In one single 
Term before the Supreme Court, the former Solicitor General had accomplished what no one had done for 
decades and what the Bar had assumed was no longer economically feasible: he had developed a highly 
profitable Supreme Court practice on behalf of private sector corporate business clients.” Id. at 1498–99. 
105 The Court, Professor Lazarus has argued: 
[S]hould itself take steps to reduce the advocacy gap. [It] can do so by appointing expert Supreme 
Court advocates in criminal defense cases where counsel is lacking more frequently. And the Court 
can promote better legal arguments by more readily agreeing to allow organizations represented by 
outstanding advocates to present oral argument as amicus curiae.  
Id. at 1562. See also Lazarus, supra note 103, at 95–97 (suggesting for reforms at the jurisdictional stage 
of review at the Supreme Court). 
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statistics put the percent of female members in the national 
bar at 27 percent.106  
Why is this so?107 What percentage of the women lawyers are 
government lawyers? And what do we in the legal academy know about the 
work-product of such important Supreme Court litigators such as Patricia 
Millett108 and other notable female members of that bar?109 Or to echo an 
earlier point, what do we know about the history of women lawyers such as 
Olive Rabe who in 1929 argued United States v. Schwimmer?110 The answer: 
we know relatively little about that history and how the women of the 
Supreme Court bar have argued any variety of cases.111   
There is one more thing: The arc of legal education in America is 
changing. That is, the curve of legal education is moving away from 
doctrinal/analytical/theoretical archetypes and ever more towards 
experiential or practice-oriented forms of education. To be sure, there will 
always be black-letter law and bar exams and all that entails. But such forms 
of education will likely exist in the caldron of experiential kinds of teaching. 
If such a change should occur, it could be only a matter of time before it has 
a spillover effect on legal scholarship. In that brave new world, the 
scholarship of the likes of Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman, John Rawls, 
 
106 RICHARD SEAMON, ANDREW SIEGEL, JOSEPH THAI & KATHRYN WATTS, THE SUPREME 
COURT SOURCEBOOK 597–98 (2013).  
107 See Tammy A. Sarver, Erin B. Kaheny & John J. Szmer, The Attorney Gender Gap in U.S. 
Supreme Court Litigation, 91 JUDICATURE 238, 242 (2008). 
108 See Patricia Millett Confirmed to U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, AKIN GUMP 
(December 10, 2013), https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/patricia-millett-confirmed-to-u-s-
court-of-appeals-for-the-d-c.html (Ms. Millett had argued 31 cases before the Supreme Court). In June 
2013, President Obama nominated Ms. Millett for a seat on the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, for which the Senate confirmed her. Id. 
109 See generally Kedar S. Bhatia, Top Supreme Court Advocates of the Twenty-First Century, 1 
J. LEGAL METRICS 561, 575 (2013) (listing top 11 women Supreme Court litigators). Maureen Mahoney, 
a former law clerk to Justice Rehnquist and now a retired partner at Latham & Watkins, has herself had a 
notable impact on the development of law in the Supreme Court. See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, 
http://www.lw.com/people/maureen-mahoney (last visited Nov. 7, 2018); Richard J. Lazarus, The Power 
of Persuasion Before and Within the Supreme Court: Reflections on Nepa’s Zero for Seventeen Record at 
the High Court, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 231, 251 (2012) (noting Mahoney’s influence at the jurisdictional 
stage in an important environmental law case). 
110 See generally United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929). Apart from pro se cases, 
Olive Rabe was the first woman to argue a free speech case in the Court, though the case was not formally 
decided on First Amendment grounds. See Ronald Collins & David Hudson, Remembering Two Forgotten 
Women in Free-speech History, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (June 27, 2008) (no longer available on Internet).  
111 See Ronald K.L. Collins, 38 Women Who Argued First Amendment Free Expression Cases in 
the Supreme Court: 1880-2018, FIRST AMEND. NEWS (Aug. 17, 2018), 
https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2018/08/fan-199-first-amendment-news-special-issue-38-
women-who-argued-first-amendment-free-expression-cases-in-the-supreme-court-1880-2018.html.  
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Roberto Unger, and Joseph Raz (impressive as it was) may begin to vanish112 
(at least for a time) like the memories of those who drank from the River of 
Lethe.113 We tend to forget the past; we tend to embrace the present; and we 
move forward as the conventions of our times point us.    
Holmes put it laconically: “When we study law we are not studying a 
mystery but a well-known profession.”114 But that it were so. If truth be 
revealed, much legal scholarship seems more interested in the mystery of the 
law than in the profession of the law—i.e. with how practitioners profess it. 
In the end, law (like life) is what we make it. The question is always, of 
course, who exactly is that we? Incredibly, too many in the academy have 
lost sight of them, both in our scholarship and teaching. Bringing lawyers 
back into that we perspective can only augment the value of legal scholarship, 
while at the same time enhancing the worth of legal education generally. To 
that end, my aim is to further inform legal scholars of the importance of such 
scholarship, to alert them to the rich possibilities for academic work in this 
area, and to suggest to them what this portends for legal education. The hope 
is that this will begin a vibrant and insightful dialogue concerning a long 
overdue and long neglected area of study. If so, the law may seem less 
mysterious and more meaningful.   
All of which brings us back to Hayden C. Covington, one of the most 
influential figures in the history of First Amendment law. Beyond the 
numerous First Amendment cases he argued or co-argued in the Supreme 
Court, he also prevailed on behalf of the Witnesses in over “100 decisions 
handed down by various state supreme courts, and . . . also triumphed in 
dozens of lower federal court rulings.”115 
Even so, we know relatively little about Hayden Covington. One will 
look long and hard to find his name in any First Amendment treatise or 
casebook. Simply consider the following observation made by Jennifer 
Jacobs Henderson in her PhD dissertation on the Witnesses and their First 
Amendment cases:  
Hayden Covington, the Witnesses’ lawyer for all but one of 
the literature distribution and permit cases that reached the 
Supreme Court, is strangely absent from discussion in 
 
112 Of course, I do not applaud this possible scenario as I think that the study of law, like the study 
of liberal arts generally, should not be confined to skills training simply but rather includes knowledge of 
matters related to the human condition more generally. By this measure, Plato’s Laws is as much a book 
of philosophy as it is one about rules and regulations concerning the governance of the polis.   
113 Lethe was one of the five rivers in Hades that flowed past the cave of Hypnos and into the 
Underworld. As Greek mythology has it, those who drank from Lethe’s waters lost all memory. See 
HARALD WEINRICH, LETHE: THE ART AND CRITIQUE OF FORGETTING 6–7 (Steven Rendall trans., 2004). 
114 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897).  
115 SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND 
THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 127 (2000).  
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[virtually all] First Amendment analyses. It is as if the cases 
were cultivated, argued and won without legal counsel. The 
focus of these works is clearly how the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
cases shaped the law, not on who shaped the law.116 
In light of this and what I have written above, now we have some idea 
why the litigation aspect of Supreme Court cases is so strikingly absent from 
contemporary legal scholarship. What remains is the story of Hayden 
Covington, a sketch of which follows. 
 
 
 
Covington’s tireless efforts helped usher in a new era 
in American constitutional jurisprudence, the “rights 
revolution” that reached its peak in the 1960s. 
– Shawn Francis Peters117 
 
Consider the following mainstays of modern First Amendment and 
constitutional law: 
• The incorporation doctrine118  
• The state action doctrine as applied to the First 
Amendment119 
• The preferred position doctrine120 
• The least restrictive means doctrine121 
What do those four cases in which those doctrines were formulated have 
in common? Was it that the same jurist wrote all of the opinions in them? 
Was that it? To ask the question is to answer it. The common denominator in 
these cases, among others, is that the same man (Hayden Covington) argued 
all of them and all of them involved the same rights claimants (Jehovah’s 
 
116 Jennifer Jacobs Henderson, Hayden Covington, the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Their Plan to 
Expand First Amendment Freedoms (July 29, 2002) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of 
Washington) 30. 
117 SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, Hayden Covington, in BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 53, 
at 132 [hereinafter PETERS]. 
118 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
119 See generally Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See also Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 
517, 520 (1946) (companion case reversing trespass conviction regarding door-to-door proselytizing in a 
town owned by an agency of the federal government). 
120 Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting), vacated, 319 U.S. 
103 (1943) (per curiam). 
121 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
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Witnesses).122 “In the mid-twentieth century, Covington handled as many as 
50 major cases every year involving the civil liberties of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, who frequently faced persecution because of their uncommon 
beliefs and often provocative behavior.” 123 There is more to the story, 
including Covington’s role in West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette.124 But that is to get ahead of the man and his legacy; more backdrop 
is needed.  
In 1933, Hayden Covington was admitted to the Texas bar. His 
admission preceded his completion of law school at the San Antonio Bar 
Association School of Law (later St. Mary’s University Law School). This 
son of a Texas Ranger spent his early practice defending insurance 
companies. But after attending a Witness convention125 in New York and 
after arguing some early Witnesses’ cases in Texas, he soon became one of 
its lawyers, and then one of its lead attorneys.126 It was an era of great hostility 
towards the Witnesses. “Between 1933 and 1951, there were 18,866 arrests 
of American Witnesses and about 1,500 cases of mob violence against 
them.”127 Such hostility, as Covington later recalled, was both extreme and 
life threatening: 
[In Connersville, Indiana it] was a mob situation that 
occurred while we were trying that seditious conspiracy case 
in Connersville, a hot bed of American Legion action and 
they ruled the whole town. In the Connersville case I used 
Brother Franz as my witness and then the jury was put on 
and it was necessary for me to get to out the case and I 
finished the argument of the case at Connersville and I tried 
to get a postponement of the case in Maine but they wouldn’t 
put it off. As result I had to race from Indianapolis to 
Cincinnati to catch the plane to Boston and that saved my 
life because that night they had conspired to kill me. I went 
to catch the airplane in Cincinnati out of Connersville, and 
then Brother Victor Schmidt, who was with me as co-
 
122 In identifying these various doctrines, I do not mean to say that Mr. Covington was the 
originator of them but rather that he brought the Witnesses’ controversies to the Court in which these 
doctrines were formulated.   
123 PETERS, supra note 117, at 132.   
124 See generally W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
125 Henderson, supra note 116, at 70; see also M. JAMES PENTON, APOCALYPSE DELAYED: THE 
STORY OF JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES 79 (2nd ed. 1997) (In 1934 at the age of 23, Covington was baptized a 
Witness). 
126 PETERS, supra note 117, at 132; see also Henderson, supra note 117, at 67–74 (detailing 
Covington’s introduction to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, their faith and followers, and his early litigation of 
Witnesses’ cases). 
127 PENTON, supra note 125, at 88. 
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coun[sel], he is now dead, he stayed. And he and his wife. 
Sister Schmidt, were mobbed by the crowed [sic] and as they 
mobbed them that night, in the darkness, after the case was 
over, they were screaming and yelling that they were going 
to kill me that night. The Lord delivered me at the right time 
and I would have been killed that night.128  
A January 1940 report by the ACLU took note of that religious animus 
against the Witnesses:  
Not since the persecution of the Mormons years ago has any 
religious minority been so bitterly and generally attacked as 
the members of Jehovah’s Witnesses—particularly the 
spring and summer of 1940. While this was the peak of the 
attacks upon them, hostility and discrimination have been 
rife for several years. Documents filed with the Department 
of Justice by attorneys for Jehovah’s Witnesses and the 
American Civil Liberties Union showed over three hundred 
thirty-five instances of mob violence in forty-four states 
during 1940, involving one thousand four hundred eighty-
eight men, women, and children.129 
Long hours and dangerous work were his lawyerly trade. By 1942, 
Covington had earned the title of “chief legal counsel.” Following the death 
of Joseph F. Rutherford (president of the Witnesses’ Watch Tower 
Society),130 
Covington took over all Supreme Court appeals for the 
organization. While he had argued many cases before the 
Supreme Court prior to this time, Rutherford’s death left him 
firmly in charge of the Witnesses’ constitutional battles. 
During one week in 1943, Covington argued fourteen cases 
before the United States Supreme Court.131  
 
128 See Full text of “Hayden C. Covington Interview”, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Nov. 19, 1978), 
https://archive.org/stream/HaydenCCovingtonInterview/HaydenCovingtonInterview_djvu.txt 
[hereinafter Covington Interview] (“It was an eighteen hour day for me to cope with [all the cases], but I 
was young and dedicated and devouring of any opposition that we had. I kept on going all the time.”).  
129 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE PERSECUTION OF JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES 3 (1941); Jennifer 
Jacobs Henderson, The Jehovah’s Witnesses and Their Plan to Expand First Amendment Freedoms, 46 J. 
CHURCH & ST. 811, 820–21 (2004) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Henderson II] (“A Life magazine 
article published in 1940 noted that the American Civil Liberties Union was involved in more than 200 
cases representing more than 1,300 Witnesses.”). 
130 M. JAMES PENTON, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES AND THE THIRD REICH: SECTARIAN POLITICS 
UNDER PERSECUTION 363 (2004) (“During his years as president of the Watch Tower Society, J.F. 
Rutherford ruled that organization–and, eventually, Jehovah’s Witnesses–with a rod of iron.”). 
131 Henderson, supra note 116, at 73–74 (footnote omitted).  
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Thereafter, his name was forever linked with that of the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses.132   
The group’s zeal, unorthodoxy, and persistence made it an easy target 
for social ostracism,133 especially when it came to matters such as patriotism. 
Consider, for example, the following tenet of their faith:  
Nowhere in the New Testament is Patriotism (a 
narrowminded hatred of other peoples) encouraged. 
Everywhere and always murder in its every form is 
forbidden; and yet, under the guise of Patriotism the civil 
governments of earth demand of peace-loving men the 
sacrifice of themselves and their loved ones and the butchery 
of their fellows, and hail it as a duty demanded by the laws 
of heaven.134 
 
132 William Shepard McAninch, A Catalyst for the Evolution of Constitutional Law: Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 997, 1003 (1987) (“The name, ‘Jehovah’s Witnesses,’ 
was not formally adopted until 1931 when the group was about fifty years old. The organization had been 
incorporated in 1884 as ‘Zion’s Watch Tower Tract Society;’ this was then changed in 1896 to the ‘Watch 
Tower Bible and Tract Society.’ In 1909, a separate corporation was formed in New York, ‘The People’s 
Pulpit Association;’ its name was changed in 1956 to ‘Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of New York, 
Inc.’”) (footnotes omitted).  
133 Allen Rostron, Demythologizing the Legal History of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the First 
Amendment: Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses: Religious Persecution and the Dawn of the Rights Revolution, 
22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 493, 522 (2004) (footnote omitted) (“[The Witnesses] did not have the ‘quiet and 
reserved personality’ of the Amish. In addition, the Witnesses’ attitude toward the state was unequivocally 
hostile. For them, the secular nations were instruments of Satan, undeserving of any form of submission, 
and to be tolerated with loathing only when absolutely necessary. The Witnesses were determined to 
worship God as they believed they should, and even gained special satisfaction from doing so in defiance 
of the law. Negotiation and compromise were tactics of last resort. Compromising would merely have 
deprived them of the opportunity to wage a good fight for Jehovah.”). 
134 McAninch, supra note 132, at 1008 (quoting 1974 Yearbook of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Part 1—
United States of America, WATCHTOWER ONLINE LIBRARY, https://wol.jw.org/en/wol/d/r1/lp-
e/301975002 (last visited Nov. 9, 2018)). 
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Hayden Covington (credit: Watchtower Bible & Tract Society) 
 
As early as 1918, the government viewed that kind of pacifism as a real 
and serious threat to the nation’s security:  
One of the most dangerous examples of this sort of 
propaganda is the book called ‘The Finished Mystery,’ a 
[Jehovah’s Witnesses’] work written in extremely religious 
language and distributed in enormous numbers. The only 
effect of it is to lead soldiers to discredit our cause and to 
inspire a feeling at home of resistance to the draft.135  
Hence, even before the famous 1943 Barnette decision, the Witnesses 
were often viewed as vile, both for their religious beliefs and for their 
purported unpatriotic attitudes toward America. These, then, were Hayden 
 
135 Id. at 1009.  
On May 7, 1918 federal warrants were issued for President Rutherford, the general manager, the secretary-
treasurer, the two compilers of The Finished Mystery, and three other members of the Society’s 
editorial committee for violation of the 1917 Espionage Act. They were charged with conspiring to 
cause insubordination in the military, conspiring to obstruct the recruiting service, attempting to 
cause insubordination in the military, and obstructing the recruiting service . . . The government’s 
evidence consisted primarily of the publications mentioned in the indictment and a record of a 
meeting of the society’s board of directors at which The Finished Mystery was discussed. The 
government avoided the difficulty posed by the fact that the book had been written before the 
enactment of both the Draft Act and the Espionage Act of 1917 by arguing that its continued sale 
after the acts’ effective dates was sufficient. The jury was convinced, and each defendant was 
convicted on every count.  
Id. at 1010–11 (footnotes omitted).  
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Covington’s clients. When their flag-salute case came before the Supreme 
Court in Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940),136 George K. Gardner 
(a Harvard Law Professor with the ACLU)137 and Joseph Rutherford argued 
the matter unsuccessfully for the Witnesses (the vote was 8-1). That may well 
have seemed to be the end of the matter—defeat by a large margin. 
Defeat, however, did not dissuade him: he petitioned the Supreme Court 
no fewer than 111 times.138 That said, between “1938 and 1958, the Supreme 
Court heard more than fifty cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses, deciding 
the vast majority of them in the Witnesses’ favor.”139 Hayden Covington was 
a key player in many of those cases. In the period between 1939 and 1955, 
he brought forty-five First Amendment cases involving free speech, press, 
and religion before the Supreme Court.140 Like Thurgood Marshall and the 
plan developed by the NAACP in race cases, Covington and Rutherford 
formulated a First Amendment litigation strategy by which to foster, try, 
appeal, and then prevail in a variety of free expression cases. To do that, one 
needed the right plaintiffs141 and the right facts, something that the Witnesses, 
thanks to their legal counsel, did not leave to chance.142 As Jennifer Jacobs 
Henderson has noted: 
Between 1938 and 1953, the Watchtower Bible and Tract 
Society published several tracts and booklets providing legal 
advice and guidance to Jehovah’s Witnesses. Written by 
 
136 See generally Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
137 M. JAMES PENTON, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES AND THE THIRD REICH: SECTARIAN POLITICS 
UNDER PERSECUTION 129 (2nd ed. 2004) (“George K. Gardner . . . made the legal arguments for the 
Witnesses’ side far better than Rutherford. But neither Rutherford’s poor performance nor Gardner’s more 
able one seemed to have any impact on the court, except for Justice Harlan Fiske Stone.”). 
138 THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 132 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009) 
(quoting SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE 
DAWN OF RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2000)). 
139 Rostron, supra note 133, at 493 (citing Clement E. Vose, Litigation as a Form of Pressure 
Group Activity, 319 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 20, 22 (1958)) (ranking Jehovah’s Witnesses 
with the NAACP as one of the most effective and frequent of organizations involved in constitutional 
litigation); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND 
CENTURY, 1888–1986, 261–68, 313–20 (1990) (compiling cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses); see also 
Joseph F. Zygmunt, Jehovah’s Witnesses in the U.S.A. 1942-1976, 24 SOC. COMPASS 45, 47 (1977) 
(reporting 3,500 cases tried in state courts and 200 appealed to higher courts by Witnesses by 1946). 
140  PENTON, supra note 125, at 88. 
141 See MARLEY COLE, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: THE NEW WORLD SOCIETY 110 (1955) 
(explaining that Covington assured Witnesses that “You are writing your faith into the laws of the land.”). 
142 Jerry Bergman, Hayden Covington: Attorney and Watchtower Society Vice President, (Nov. 
2004), http://ed5015.tripod.com/JwCovington99.htm (“Covington looked for cases and people who could 
win. They would interview a person and conclude, ‘He’s not quite right. He loses his cool and is not very 
articulate.’ They wanted people who had good reputations in the community, who were store owners, or 
shopkeepers that had a good chance of winning. They tried to eliminate all extraneous things that are 
brought up in court cases. They wanted women, especially presentable, attractive women who were 
articulate and had children who they felt would elicit sympathy from the jury.”). 
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Judge Rutherford, president of the Watchtower Bible and 
Tract Society, and Olin R. Moyle and Hayden C. Covington, 
Jehovah’s Witness legal counsel, these tracts informed 
Witnesses of their legal rights to proselytize. They also 
explained how they could avoid arrest, how they should 
respond once arrested, how to prepare for trial once arrested 
and what arguments to use in preparing court briefs.143 
When Covington assumed the reins of legal power for the Witness, the 
Watchtower legal department was a small but active one: there was the chief 
counsel, several legal assistants, and clerical help.  
The legal department was not proactive . . . until Hayden 
Covington arrived. Covington’s first task was to develop a 
legal strategy as aggressive as [his predecessor’s] spiritual 
one. The first step of his plan was to identify local 
communities where Witnesses faced legal roadblocks to 
their ministry.144  
Moreover, and as Professor Henderson observed:  
Covington would determine which communities were 
targeted for intensive fieldwork, and thus, potential future 
litigation. Covington would “send people into areas they 
knew would be a problem, specially if there was a large 
Catholic population,” “an active priest,” or “previous 
opposition.” Covington would simply inform a certain 
congregation that they needed to preach in a certain 
territory,145 often adding, “It hasn’t been preached in 
awhile.” 
 Covington also delighted in telling his Witness clients they were 
“writing [their] faith into the laws of the land.”146 While that was stretch, it 
was nonetheless true that the practice of their faith led to a series of cases 
(most argued by Covington) that changed the law of the land.  
 
143 Henderson, supra note 116, at 26 (footnotes omitted). 
144 Henderson II, supra note 129, at 816–17 (footnotes omitted). 
145 Id. at 818 (“The job of these Witnesses, in addition to spreading the word of God, was to get 
arrested, thus clogging the local jail and legal system and freeing up local members to return to their work. 
By replacing local members with mobile Witnesses in the jails, Covington was able to ensure that the 
Watchtower could continue to spread the Word of God and generate test cases. With law enforcement and 
court officials tied up in processing the newly arrived Witnesses, local Witness members were free to 
continue proselytizing. The mobile Witnesses, recently arrested under the same questionable ordinances, 
provided new opportunities for trial and appeal.”) (footnotes omitted).  
146 Henderson, supra note 116, at 83 (footnote omitted).  
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Then there was the working alliance the Witnesses’ legal counsel forged 
with the ACLU in developing key arguments and how best to appeal a case.147 
Covington also had the legal savvy to link the plight of his client 
pamphleteers to that of the mainstream media.148 He had a way of linking 
secular First Amendment claims to religious ones. By this measure, he was 
able to recruit the favor of both press groups and civil liberties ones. 
Consider, for example, what he wrote in his brief in Schneider v. Irvington149: 
“What mysterious quality can there be in the principles of constitutional law 
which prohibits licensing or censoring of the press but authorizes a license 
for preaching the gospel of God’s kingdom?”150  
Largely because of such factors, among others, Covington (an 18-hour 
day workhorse151) “had a success rate before the United States Supreme 
Court higher than any man except former NAACP attorney and Supreme 
Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, claiming victory in 36 of 42 Supreme 
Court cases.”152 Even so, though Zechariah Chafee, Jr. devoted a section of 
his Free Speech in the United States to the Witnesses’ cases (titled “Peddlers 
of Ideas”153), he was doctrinally unsympathetic to their claims154 and found 
no reason to mention Hayden Covington, which even if he had his portrayal 
would have been a uncomplimentary one.  
Beyond his successful strategies for identifying good-fact cases and then 
taking them up on appeal (a critical talent), when it came to his Supreme 
Court manner, Covington was often more style than substance. For example, 
a reporter for Newsweek commenting on his argument in Cantwell v. 
Connecticut (1940)155 portrayed his style this way:  
 
147 See id. at 26. 
148 See Brief for Petitioner, Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (No. 280), 1941 WL 
52767, quoted in Henderson, supra note 116, at 168 (“There is no difference between proportionately 
taxing the publishing corporation having the larger circulation and imposing the license tax or fee upon a 
boy or other person distributing pamphlets or leaflets. The result, regardless of motives, is to discourage, 
hinder or destroy circulation.”). 
149 Brief for Petitioner, Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (No. 11), 1939 WL 48518. 
150 Id. at 32. 
151 See Covington Interview, supra note 128 (“It was an eighteen hour day for me to cope with [all 
the cases], but I was young and dedicated and devouring of any opposition that we had. I kept on going 
all the time.”). 
152 Henderson, supra note 116, at 67, 74–75 (referencing “18–20 hour” days); see also SAMUEL 
WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 107 (1990) (discussing that 
Thurgood Marshall won 29 of 32 cases before the Supreme Court as the lead attorney for the NAACP’s 
Legal Defense Fund). 
153 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 398–409 (1941). 
154 But that would change when Chafee included his name on an amicus brief filed by the 
Committee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar Association in support of the Witnesses in the 
Barnette case. See text accompanying notes 179–183 infra.  
155 PETERS, supra note 117, at 132. 
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A precedent-buster extraordinary, the 6-foot lawyer erupted 
into the austere chamber in a bright green suit with padded 
shoulders and red plaid tie. Locking his hands behind his 
back and bending his body into a right angle, or tucking his 
thumbs into his green vest and lifting his head, he roared, 
first at the black-robed justices and then at the audience: 
“Jehovah’s Witnesses are plain people who derive their 
authority to preach the truth from Jehovah himself, not from 
organized wealthy groups. Many of them are poor and 
uneducated.” Then, glowering at Justice Murphy, a Catholic: 
“They don’t preach in a dead language.”156  
His charismatic style notwithstanding, Covington prevailed in Cantwell 
and in many other First Amendment cases as well. For example, his strategy 
and style helped him to prevail in such important cases as Marsh v. 
Alabama,157 Murdock v. Pennsylvania,158 and Martin v. Struthers.159 True, he 
lost some cases: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,160 Prince v. 
Massachusetts,161 Jones v. City of Opelika,162 and Douglas v. Jeannette.163 
But overall, he was on the winning side far more often than not. He won 85% 
of the 44 cases that he argued before the High Court.164 What Covington 
lacked in doctrinal nuance he ventured to make up with a certain down-to-
earth humanism that may well have moved certain members of the Court, 
even if they had to do some jurisprudential spadework to help him prevail on 
behalf of the persecuted clients he so vigorously defended. Perhaps this 
picture of him is most apparent in his most famous case, one he won.  
 
156 Witness’s Angle, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 22, 1943, at 68. 
157 See generally Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
158 See generally Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).   
159 See generally Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).   
160 See generally Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), discussed in JUDGING 
JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES, supra note 115, at 203–29. 
161 See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
162 Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600 (1942) [hereinafter Jones v. Opelika I] (upholding 
a licensing tax imposed against the Witnesses). Of course, the dissents in this case flagged a new 
willingness of several of the Justices to move away from the holding in Minersville School District v. 
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). Justices Murphy, Black, and Douglas joined Stone’s dissent in Jones , 316 
U.S. at 600. More directly, they informed the reversal in the one paragraph per curiam ruling in Jones v. 
City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) [hereinafter Jones v. Opelika II], the Justices vacated Jones v. 
Opelika I on the basis of the reasons set forth in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).  
163 See generally Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). 
164 JOHN R. VILE, GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 134 (1st ed. 2001), noted in 
John R. Vile, Hayden Covington, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1392/hayden-covington (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2018). Thurgood Marshall’s success rate in the 36 of 42 cases he won in the Supreme 
Court was slightly higher: 85.71%. Id. 
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The case: West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,165 the 
wartime flag-salute case. Recall, Barnette came to the Court against the 
backdrop of an 8-1 ruling in the Gobitis case with only Justice Stone in 
dissent.166 Then there was the appalling aftermath of the Gobitis ruling 
against the Witnesses: Six days after the ruling came down,  
a mob of 2,500 burned the Kingdom Hall in Kennebunkport, 
Maine. On June 16, Litchfield, Illinois police jailed all of 
that town’s sixty Witnesses, ostensibly protecting them from 
their neighbors. [Shortly thereafter], townspeople in 
Rawlins, Wyoming brutally beat five Witnesses; on June 22, 
the people of Parco, Wyoming tarred and feathered another. 
The American Civil Liberties Union reported to the Justice 
Department that nearly 1,500 Witnesses were physically 
attacked in more than 300 communities nationwide. One 
Southern sheriff told a reporter why Witnesses were being 
run out of town: “They’re traitors; the Supreme Court says 
so. Ain’t you heard?”167 
Hence, when Covington argued the case he had an 8-1 precedent against 
him and a notable measure of ongoing public animus directed towards his 
clients.168 Then again, he was the beneficiary of a newly constituted Court.169 
Even so, Justice Robert Jackson, who would become the Witnesses’ hero in 
 
165 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Covington’s role in the case is 
discussed at some length in David R. Mainwaring’s book. See DAVID R. MAINWARING, RENDER UNTO 
CAESAR: THE FLAG SALUTE CONTROVERSY (1962). 
166 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 601. And then there was the adverse ruling in Jones v. Opelika I, 316 U.S. 
584 (1942). 
167 Minersville Sch. District v. Gobitis, WIKIPEDIA (Oct. 12, 2018, 12:48 PM), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minersville_School_District_v._Gobitis (last visited Oct. 1, 2018). 
168 Though some of the major newspapers were supportive of the Witnesses. See, e.g., Editorial, 
Religious Freedom, WASH. POST, June 16, 1943, at 16; Lewis Wood, Rutledge Joins Supreme Court Civil 
Liberty Cases are Reopened, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1943, at 1; Lewis Wood, Jehovah Sect Wins in High 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1943, at 6. 
169 See Patrick J. Flynn, “Writing Their Faith into the Law of the Land:” Jehovah’s Witnesses and 
the Supreme Court’s Battle for the Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, 1939-1945, 10 TEX. J.C.L. & 
C.R. 1, 11–16 (2004); Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise in Presidential Leadership, 86 
WASH. U. L. REV. 363, 392–401 (2008). Other cases argued and won by Covington include: Jones v. 
Opelika II, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (per curiam) (reversing state court judgments adverse to Petitioners); 
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (9-0 decision) (holding that Dallas ordinance violated free 
exercise); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943) (8-0 decision) (holding that Paris, Texas ordinance 
requiring permits in order to solicit orders for books was unconstitutional); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 
583 (1943) (9-0 decision) (finding that criminal sanction cannot be imposed for communication that has 
not been shown to have been done with an evil or sinister purpose); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 
U.S. 573 (1944) (6-3 decision) (striking down local ordinance as violative of free exercise guaranteed by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments as applied to Witnesses who distributed religious tracts and who 
made their livelihood from such sales); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (5-4 decision) (striking 
down sound amplification law as impermissible prior restraint). 
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Barnette, was unsympathetic toward them only a month earlier when he 
penned his concurrence in Douglas v. City of Jeannette170 (a 9-0 loss). There, 
Jackson complained of the “singular persistence of the turmoil about 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, one which seems to result from the work of no other 
sect.”171 As he saw it, his colleagues should commence “a thorough 
examination of their methods to see if they impinge unduly on the rights of 
others.”172 To compound the problem for Covington’s clients, Jackson quoted 
from Professor Chafee’s Freedom of Speech in the United States: “I cannot 
help wondering whether the Justices of the Supreme Court are quite aware of 
the effect of organized front-door intrusions upon people who are not 
sheltered from zealots and impostors by a staff of servants or the locked 
entrance of an apartment house.”173 From a lawyer’s perspective, such 
declarations by a revered Justice were not good omens.  
Then again, there were others who viewed the First Amendment matter 
through a different lens, one sympathetic to the Witnesses. Notably, in a June 
16, 1940 radio address, then Solicitor General Francis Biddle spoke openly 
in defense of the Witnesses: 
Jehovah’s Witnesses have been repeatedly set upon and 
beaten. They had committed no crime; but the mob adjudged 
they had, and meted out mob punishment. The Attorney 
General has ordered an immediate investigation of these 
outrages. The people must be alert and watchful, and above 
all cool and sane. Since mob violence will make the 
government’s task infinitely more difficult, it will not be 
tolerated. We shall not defeat the Nazi evil by emulating its 
methods.174 
Not long thereafter, Biddle spoke publicly once more, this time before 
the Pennsylvania Bar Association: “Self-constituted bands of mob 
patrioteers,” he declared, “are roaming the country, setting upon these people, 
 
170 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 166 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring). Even so, 
Harold Ickes noted a discussion he had with Robert Jackson, before he was a Justice, who was said to be 
“particularly bitter about the decision recently handed down by the Supreme Court in the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses case . . . .” Vol. III, HAROLD L. ICKES, The Lowering Clouds 1939–1941, in THE SECRET DIARY 
OF HAROLD L. ICKES 1, 211 (1954).  
171 Douglas, 319 U.S. at 181. 
172 Id. Contrast the statement in the text with what Jackson wrote in Barnette: “The freedom 
asserted by these appellees does not bring them into collision with rights asserted by any other individual.” 
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943). 
173 Douglas, 319 U.S. at 182, n.3 (citing CHAFEE, supra note 154, at 407). 
174 Jerry Bergman, The Modern Religious Objection to Mandatory Flag Salute in America: A 
History and Evaluation, 39 J. CHURCH & ST. 215, 232 (1997); Francis Biddle, Solicitor General, 
Department of Justice, National Radio Address (June 16, 1940). 
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beating them, driving them out of their homes.”175 Here by contrast, from a 
lawyer’s perspective, such declarations from the Solicitor General were good 
omens.  
As for Mr. Covington and Barnette, he had the good fortune of having 
an amicus brief filed in support of his clients by the Committee on the Bill of 
Rights of the American Bar Association.176 One of the people on that 
committee was none other than Professor Zechariah Chafee, the same man 
who (like Justice Jackson) had been a critic of the Witnesses and their 
proselyting. Covington’s merits brief echoed177 some of the important 
arguments filed by the Committee in its amicus brief in Gobitis,178 which in 
part declared:  
The Committee has no interest in this litigation save as its 
outcome (a) will affect the integrity of the basic right to 
freedom of conscience, and (b) will bear upon the extent of 
governmental power affirmatively to force our people to 
express themselves in a particular manner. In this latter 
aspect the case presents a constitutional question apparently 
new to this Court, in that the question relates to the validity 
of an affirmative command that the individual shall perform 
a certain ritual. This is a new type of legislation, raising 
questions different from the validity of a mere restraint or 
prohibition against a particular form of expression, e.g., 
seditious or obscene utterances.179 
Furthermore, the Committee argued that (i) a finding of fact regarding a 
sincere religious belief cannot dismissed by some claim by the state to the 
contrary,180 (ii) if the state is to prevail over such claims of conscience where 
compulsion is involved, it must prove that “overriding . . . the individual’s 
religious belief is essential in the public interest,”181 and (iii) “to compel the 
salute over objection is an unconstitutional infringement upon individual 
 
175 PETERS, supra note 115, at 10. 
176 Brief for Comm. on the Bill of Rights of the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (No. 591).  
177 See Henderson, supra note 116, at 32 (citing DAVID R. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: 
THE FLAG SALUTE CONTROVERSY (1962)).  
178 Brief for Comm. on the Bill of Rights of the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Minersville Sch. Dist v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (No. 690). 
179 Id. at 2–3.  
180 Id. at 5.  
181 Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
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liberty, even though the refusal to comply is not deemed to involve a religious 
question.”182 The latter argument proved dispositive in Barnette.  
Then there was Covington’s oral argument in the case. Drawing on a 
U.S. Law Week summary of those arguments from the time,183 Professor John 
Q. Barrett identified the following nine arguments made by Covington: 
1. The Barnett sisters were directly challenging the correctness of the 
Court’s 1940 decision, Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 
upholding the constitutionality of compelling children who were 
Jehovah’s Witnesses to salute the American flag in their public 
school.  
2. There was no “more unstatesman-like decision” in the law than 
Gobitis, “except possibly the Dred Scott decision.”  
3. The effect of Gobitis had been “to restrain conscience and prohibit the 
free exercise thereof.”  
4. In Gobitis, the Supreme Court “shifted the burden of interpreting the 
Constitution back to the school boards throughout the country” and 
said, in effect, that their decisions would determine the rights of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses.  
5. Because “it is human to err and divine to forgive,” the Court should 
reconsider Gobitis.  
6. Gobitis advocated people fighting this issue out in the public forum. 
The effect had been a “civil war against Jehovah’s Witnesses,” 
including 48 states passing mandatory flag salute laws, expulsions of 
more than 20,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses from public schools, and 
other forms of persecution. 
7. West Virginia admitted that Jehovah’s Witness school children 
refusing to salute the flag while paying due respect to it in other ways 
did not pose a clear and present danger to the community, so there 
was no basis to deny the children’s exercise of their religious 
convictions.  
8. Three years of experience since Gobitis indicated that the only clear 
and present danger resulting from a refusal to salute the flag was the 
danger that the person so refusing would be mauled or killed.  
9. Gobitis, “one of the greatest mistakes that this Court has ever 
committed,” should be reversed.184  
 
182 Id.; see also id. at 16 (explaining that the legislation at issue here “is of a sort new to America. 
We have noted . . . its novelty as an attempt to compel a particular form of expression as distinguished 
from restraints on certain kinds of expression.”). 
183 JOHN Q. BARRETT, ARGUING BARNETTE, ET AL. (1943) 1–2 (2013), 
http://thejacksonlist.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/20130311-Jackson-List-Arguing-Barnette.pdf. 
184 Id. at 2–3 (footnotes omitted). 
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While such arguments may have won Covington some sympathy for his 
clients, they were not the kind of arguments that carried much jurisprudential 
weight.185 It is true: When it came to a panoramic knowledge of doctrinal 
law, he was no Laurence Tribe or Kathleen Sullivan; when it came to nuance, 
he was no Paul Clement or Neal Katya; and when it came to familiarity with 
the history and jurisprudence of the First Amendment, he was no Floyd 
Abrams or Robert Corn-Revere. Still, he was the lawyer who found and 
prepared his clients; he was the one who tried the cases and then appealed 
them; and he was the one who had the savvy to provide the right facts at the 
right time to the right Court. None of the other luminaries brought that to the 
table. In that sense, Hayden Covington could rightfully claim a place among 
the great lawyers of the Supreme Court bar . . . and in the process gave new 
and sustained meaning to the First Amendment. 
 
 
 
The Lawyer & the Boxer: Beyond his fame as a First Amendment 
lawyer, Hayden Covington also became one of the noted figures of the 1960s 
counter-culture, sort of. It all had to do with a May 8, 1967 grand jury 
indictment of man who refused induction into the military at the time of the 
Vietnam War. That man was Cassius Clay, the infamous boxer who later 
came to be known as Muhammad Ali.186  
There is an Associated Press photo of a smiling Muhammad Ali flanked 
by his attorney, Hayden Covington. The two talked with reporters after Ali 
was arraigned in Houston.187 The boxer’s bond was set at $5,000. The smiles 
between the two did not continue, however, as the first round of legal 
proceedings did not favor the notorious champion. In part, that may well have 
 
185 Gregory L. Peterson et al., Recollections of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 
81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 755, 782 (2007). One of Justice Stone’s law clerk from the time, Bennett Boskey, 
has observed: “Hayden Covington argued many cases in the Supreme Court. Many of them were won by 
his side. There were those who said that his arguments had absolutely nothing to do with it, that it was 
because of the views that the Justices had come to already and not the briefs or the arguments being made 
by counsel that produced the result.” Id. 
186 See generally WINSTON BOWMAN, UNITED STATES V. CLAY: MUHAMMAD ALI’S FIGHT 
AGAINST THE VIETNAM DRAFT 1 (2018), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/trials/U.S._v._Clay_Muhammad_Ali%27s_Fight.pdf. The legal 
side of the story is ably detailed in Winston Bowman’s United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight 
Against the Vietnam Draft. Id. As recounted by Bowman, “Moments after receiving news that Ali had 
formally refused to enter the military, the New York Athletic Commission, a powerful regulatory body in 
the boxing world, suspended his boxing license. Other major licensing organizations soon followed suit, 
making it virtually impossible for Ali to box in the United States.” Id.  
187 See Ed Kolenovsky, Covington Ali, FREDERICKSBURG.COM (June 4, 2016), 
https://www.fredericksburg.com/covington-ali/image_15dba72e-2a0e-11e6-ae2d-53bdd6f071e2.html. 
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been owing to the way Covington handled the case. In that regard, legal 
historian Winston Bowman has noted:  
At trial, Covington opted not to emphasize the potential 
weaknesses in the DOJ’s legal recommendations, primarily 
relying on other defenses, including arguments that Ali 
should be classified as a religious minister and that the draft 
process itself was unfair. Covington likely should have 
known that the Department’s recommendations offered a 
real opportunity to attack Ali’s classification, however. 
Several years earlier, he had successfully argued an 
analogous case, Sicurella v. United States (1955),188 in 
which the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a 
conscientious objector because of a flawed DOJ 
recommendation. Importantly, in Sicurella, the Court 
established a rule to the effect that erroneous advice on any 
element of a conscientious objector claim required reversal 
of a draft evasion conviction, even if a board might have 
decided the case on other, valid grounds. The premise of this 
rule was that because the boards did not produce written 
opinions stating the rationale for their decisions, it was 
impossible to tell whether an objector’s claim had been 
denied on proper or improper grounds.189  
The trial in United States v. Clay lasted two days. Covington asked few 
questions of the government’s three witness. His defense was as simple, 
apparently too simple: the government, he maintained, was processing 
classification claims at such a furious pace that it could not have possibly 
given due consideration to his client’s claims. Moreover, the draft board 
clerks based their biased decision on press stories about Ali—hardly credible. 
To that end, Covington called two of the clerks of the local draft boards. That 
tactic had only partial success owing to the judge’s rulings limiting the scope 
of such questioning. To compound the problem, Covington called a member 
of the draft board of appeals to the witness stand; it proved embarrassing: the 
man “was not one of the board members who had deliberated on Ali’s draft 
status.”190 And when he had the opportunity to contest the DOJ’s assessment 
of Ali’s religious beliefs, he made other arguments, again not compelling 
ones. The result: after a mere twenty minutes, the jury returned a guilty 
 
188 Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385, 385–86 (1955) (discussing how Covington argued the 
cause and filed a brief for the petitioner). 
189 BOWMAN, supra note 186, at 14. 
190 Id. at 15. 
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verdict. The sentence: five years in a federal prison and a $10,000 fine.191 It 
was the maximum.  
Of course, the conviction was appealed. When it went up before the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Hayden Covington’s services were no 
longer sought. Sometime afterwards,192 the famed counsel sued the famed 
boxer to the tune of $250,000 in attorney’s fees, purportedly for unpaid 
services.193  
After the matter was argued194 before the high Court, the vote originally 
appeared to be 5-3 (with Justice Marshall not participating) to uphold Ali’s 
conviction.195 But in the end, it all played out in Ali’s favor196: 8-0 to reverse 
by way of a per curiam opinion with Justices Harlan and Douglas writing 
separate concurring opinions. It all ended quite well for Hayden Covington’s 
client,197 despite his trial court strategies. Not surprisingly, missing from the 
press photos of the time was one with the famous boxer and his once famous 
lawyer. 
 
 
 
I think he was a crusader. He was a fighter. He needed 
a cause to fight for, and this was a cause he found.198 
 
Winning for him was losing because when he won 
his purpose in life was gone. 199 
– Jerry Bergman 
 
He won many cases, but by 1978 his glory days were past. All that were 
left were memories of many cases won and some lost, but even those were 
“righteous” losses. His time and come and passed. He was a man no longer 
 
191 Id. at 16. 
192 Id. “Having been rebuffed by the Fifth Circuit, Ali appealed to the Supreme Court, which 
remanded the case to Judge Ingraham’s court for procedural reasons.” Id. at 18. 
193 Id. at 16. 
194 Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 698 (1971) (discussing how Chauncey Eskridge argued 
the cause for Petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Jonathan 
Shapiro, and Elizabeth B. DuBois. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold argued the cause for the United 
States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Wilson and Beatrice Rosenberg.). 
195 See Bowman, supra note 186, at 20. 
196 See Clay, 403 U.S. at 705, 710. 
197 BOWMAN, supra note 186, at 22. “In 2005, President George W. Bush awarded Ali the 
Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor.” Id. 
198 Henderson, supra note 116, at 67 (citing Interview with Jerry Bergman in Montpelier, Ohio 
(May 18, 2002)). 
199 Bergman, supra note 142. 
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kept alive by a cause, by a fight,200 by that chance to charge into a battle 
against all odds—he was a war-torn soldier with no more wars to fight. And 
then there was money: it was always a struggle making ends meet, especially 
when he went out on his own.201 At a time when men were seen as the sole 
breadwinners, his wife Dorothy202 “took care of the family and worked full 
time (in the pressroom of a Cincinnati newspaper for over 20 years).”203 
Worse still, then as now, he was a virtual unknown in the legal profession, in 
the constitutional world, and in the First Amendment community. In that 
sense, he was dead even before he died.  
In an interview two days before he died, Covington (age 67) looked back 
on law and life, albeit with his mind on the Lord: “you have got to recognize 
the power that’s against us,” he said, and then added, “without the power that 
Jehovah’s got helping us out, we’re dead ducks.”204 It had been a long battle, 
first fighting for the Church, and then against the demon drink,205 and even 
against the Witnesses’ president whom he tagged a “cobra”—”‘Do you know 
what a cobra does? They’ll slither behind you, and they’ll strike 
viciously.’”206 Predictably, this great champion of the Witnesses was 
 
200 Id.  
Covington had no qualms about fighting physically. He said, “If someone looks at me the wrong 
way I’ll beat the s— out of him.” He was a fighter, and that is one reason why he did so well in 
court. Covington freely used profanity, which could have been due to his Texas upbringing (his 
father was a Texas Ranger). This surprised me: Witnesses usually don’t swear. He was good with 
words, was very aggressive in court, and loved a good fight. Part of his downfall was, as the Society 
won more and more cases, there was less and less need to fight. 
Id.  
201 Id. Said his wife, Dorothy: “He would get a job at a law firm and handle a case or two, but 
would soon be let go.” Id. “After Covington was disfellowshiped [see text infra accompanying note 207] 
from the Witnesses in 1963, he almost wholly abandoned his legal career. While he worked from time to 
time on cases for various law firms, he was unable to hold down a position for more than a few months.” 
Henderson, supra note 116, at 79. 
202 Dorothy Covington, Wife of Civil Liberties Attorney Hayden Covington, Dies at 92, JW.ORG 
(Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.jw.org/en/news/legal/by-region/united-states/dorothy-covington-dies/. 
203 Bergman, supra note 143. 
204 Id.; Covington Interview, supra note 128. 
205 Henderson, supra note 116, at 79 (footnotes omitted).  
In 1963, twenty-four years after Hayden Covington accepted the job at the Watchtower Bible and 
Tract Society, he was disfellowshipped from the organization. The official reason behind 
Covington’s removal from the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society was alcohol abuse. Colin 
Quackenbush described Covington’s weakness for alcohol as falling ‘into the trap of drinking too 
much.’ M. James’ Penton, in Apocalypse Delayed suggested that Covington’s drinking problem was 
a symptom of ‘overwork and tension’ from almost twenty-five years of service in the legal 
department.  
Id. 
206 Bergman, supra note 142. 
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disfellowshipped, meaning he was excommunicated. Shortly before his 
death, however, he was reinstated.207  
If you venture to Covina Hills, California, you’ll find Mr. Covington 
resting at plot 3, block 5727 of the Forest Lawn Memorial Park Cemetery. 
His headstone reads: 
 
HAYDEN C. COVINGTON 
Beloved Husband and Father 
Jan. 19, 1911–Nov. 21, 1978208 
 
Those words seem ironic for two reasons: first, apparently, he was not 
the best of husbands and fathers,209 and second, no lasting words were cast 
for his greatest life achievement—that of a lawyer who argued and won more 
First Amendment cases in the Supreme Court than all others. His tombstone 
was thus lacking; it needed to be reversed if only to give Hayden Covington 
the credit he deserves. The past, after all, lives only in the memories of the 
living. 
 
207 VILE, supra note 164, at 139; Henderson, supra note 116, at 82 (footnote omitted) (“Covington 
was formally reinstated to the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society just prior to his death in 1978. He was 
a dedicated Witness upon his return to the Society, choosing fieldwork as a new mission. Colin 
Quackenbush reported that the Sunday prior to Covington’s death, he was ‘out in the field for seven 
hours.’”).  
208 Richard Pittman, image post to Hayden Cooper Covington, FIND A GRAVE (Sept. 3, 2015),  
https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/61896595/hayden-cooper-covington. 
209 See Bergman, supra note 142.  
Covington’s fall from grace was not just a personal struggle. His family was directly influenced by 
both his lack of work and his alcoholism. For example, Covington’s wife left a full-time position 
raising her children for a full-time position in the pressroom of a Cincinnati newspaper. [Jerry] 
Bergman, who spoke with Covington’s wife during his interview, said she resented the fact he could 
not or would not support his own family . . . These problems ultimately lead, in the mid-1970s, to a 
separation between Covington and his wife. Although he was drinking more than working, 
Covington made the decision to leave his wife and her continued connection to the Witnesses. While 
they never officially divorced, their separation marked the end of a long, painful period in the 
Covington family history. In the late 1970s, Hayden Covington “hit rock bottom.” His alcohol abuse 
had led to liver disease so severe his doctors said that if he did not stop drinking he would die.  
Henderson, supra note 116, at 81 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Robert H. Jackson Center, Lynn Covington 
Elfers (2018) on Hayden Covington, 17:33, YOUTUBE (Oct. 19, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pgv8LmfhmpI (“I’m proud to be genetically connected to someone 
that had such an [impact] on American jurisprudence. Really. It’s, of course, something that any daughter 
would really be proud of.”). 
